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ABSTRACT 
Bitcoin blockchain technology is a distributed ledger of nodes 
authorizing transactions between anonymous parties. Its key 
actors are miners using computational power to solve 
mathematical problems for validating transactions. By sharing 
blockchain’s characteristics, mining is a decentralized, 
transparent and unregulated practice, but we know little about 
miners’ motivations and experiences and how these may impact 
on different dimensions of trust. This paper reports on 
interviews with 20 bitcoin miners about their practices and trust 
challenges. Findings contribute to HCI theories by extending the 
exploration of blockchain’s characteristics relevant to trust with 
competitiveness underpinning the social organization of mining. 
We discuss the risks of collaborative mining due to 
centralization and dishonest administrators, and conclude with 
design implications highlighting the need for tools monitoring 
the distribution of rewards in collaborative mining, tools 
tracking data centers’ authorization and reputation, and tools 
supporting the development of decentralized pools. 
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• Human Centered Computing • Human Computer Interaction 
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1 Introduction 
Blockchain technology is a distributed ledger of nodes involved 
in authorizing bitcoins transactions between anonymous parties 
[41] whose growth has received increased interest from private 
sectors and academic communities [3][15][18] 
[28][29][33][48][49]. At the core of blockchain, ecosystems are 
miners and their validation of transactions through consensus-
based proof-of-work. By sharing blockchain’s characteristics, 
mining is a decentralized, transparent and unregulated yet 
lucrative practice as miners are rewarded in bitcoins for their 
successfully validated proof-of-work. The reward together with 
the growing value of bitcoins and their planned scarcity 
[6][11][41] has attracted more miners to a practice which has 




On the one hand, the purposefully design trustless mining 
protocol [6][41][46] does not require a third-party entity to 
authorize transactions but merely miners’ consensus, which in 
turn supports people’s trust in blockchain [41][57]. On the other 
hand, the emerging social organization of mining practices 
brings forward issues of trust among miners such as the risk of 
51% attack [15][19] or of selfish miners [16][25][47][55], 
explored mostly within the security research area. Relevant HCI 
works on blockchain and its trust related issues have started to 
emerge [33][48][49]. We agree with the argument that 
blockchain offers a unique perspective to explore trust as its 
characteristics contrast with the centralized, regulated, and non-
anonymous traditional transaction systems which have informed 
the existing HCI models of trust [23][45]. However, apart from 
modeling-based security research on mining, we know little 
about miners’ practices from their first-person perspective, and 
how the specific blockchain’s characteristics impact on their 
trust. To address this gap, we report on interviews with 20 
Bitcoin blockchain miners about their mining practices and 
related trust challenges, in order to explore the following 
research questions: 
1. Which are miners’ motivations for bitcoin mining? 
2. Which are Bitcoin blockchain’s’ characteristics impacting on 
miners’ trust and its dimensions? 
3. Which is the social organization of mining practices: are 
there different approaches and types of miners?  
4.  Which are the main trust challenges and how do people 
attempt to mitigate them? 
 
2 Related Work 
Our work draws from HCI theories of trust, blockchain 
technology, and its mining protocol, as well as work in security 
research on mining-related threats. 
2.1 Trust in HCI 
In their framework of trust in Bitcoin technology, Sas and 
Khairuddin [48] identified three trust dimensions: technological 
(users’ trust in Bitcoin technology), social (trust among users, 
miners, exchanges and merchants), and institutional 
(government trust in Bitcoin technology). In a later study on 
bitcoin’s users [49], they showed that users’ technological trust 
grounded in the cryptographic protocol is strong, their social 
trust is challenged by dishonest traders, and that institutional 
trust should be extended to users’ trust in governments and 





feasibility of two HCI theories [23][45] for exploring the trust of 
bitcoin users. They identified key blockchain’s characteristics 
impacting on bitcoin users’ trust such as decentralization, 
unregulation, transparent, easy, and low-cost transactions.  
 
Corritore and colleagues’ model of online trust [23] defines trust 
as the willingness to be vulnerable and identifies three trust 
factors: users’ perception of technology’s credibility, ease of use, 
and risk. Sas and Khairuddin’s [49] findings suggested that for 
bitcoin users, the blockchain’s credibility is supported by the 
decentralized public ledger, cryptographic protocol, and miners’ 
competence; the ease of use is ensured by ease and quick 
transactions, while limited risks of institutional abuse of power 
is supported by the unregulation of blockchain. Bitcoin users’ 
main trust challenge relates to insecure transactions, particularly 
when dealing with dishonest traders.  
 
Riegelsberger and colleagues’ [45] framework on the mechanics 
of trust explores technology-mediated trust between users, 
identifying its contextual and intrinsic properties ensuring trust. 
These include temporal embeddedness of transactions within a 
past/future timeframe which ensures that parties get to know 
each other and are motivated to avoid defection in order to 
sustain future relationship gains. Social embeddedness relates to 
the earned reputation which parties are motivated to protect; 
while institutional embeddedness refers to legal aspects which 
could enforce sanctions when the parties do not meet their 
contractual agreement. Sas and Khairuddin [49] identified that 
bitcoin users exploit institutional embeddedness when dealing 
with exchanges as legally authorized services, and social 
embeddedness when dealing with reputable traders, 
underpinned by the temporal embeddedness of repeated 
transactions.  
 
To conclude, HCI models of trust identified key dimensions of 
technological and social trust including risks, but their feasibility 
for the investigation of trust related to blockchain technology 
has just started to be explored. 
2.2 Bitcoins’ Blockchain Technology and 
Mining Protocol 
Bitcoins’ blockchain technology consists of a distributed ledger 
hosted by a peer to peer network of full nodes designed by an 
anonymous entity Nakamoto [34][41][49]. The full nodes’ role is 
to test the validity of each transaction created by bitcoin users, 
which once approved becomes permanently recorded in the 
public ledger [34]. The open source mining protocol consists of 
consensus-based proof-of-work, which is core to the 
transactions’ validation process. Each requested transaction is 
first verified by the full nodes [7] to ensure that it meets the 
validity guidelines for inclusion in a new block [7][41], i.e., a 
record file created every 10 minutes for storing up to 1MB of 
pending transactions [6][41]. Then, in order to be validated, 
transactions are broadcasted to the network as part of their block 
which miners start processing; they compete to be the first to 
solve the block’s complex mathematical problem [6][41]. Once 
the problem is solved, the miner broadcast their proof-of-work 
to the network to get the consents from other miners to record 
the new block in the bitcoin blockchain and the winning miner’s 
block will be verified by the full nodes [7][6][41]. Upon 
successful verification, the block is recorded on the public ledger, 
though it is recommended for the merchants, exchanges, and 
users who accept bitcoin as payment to wait for another 6 new 
blocks to be confirmed on top of the current block. [6][41]. The 
winning miner has rewarded 12.5 bitcoins [32]. This number is 
halved every four years in order to reduce the rewards which 
demand higher computational power to sustain mining profit. 
This also reflects the scarcity of bitcoins whose total supply of 21 
million will be completed by 2140 [6][35]. Winning miners are 
also rewarded by transaction fees albeit these are covered not by 
the blockchain system but by the transaction parties [2][41]. 
 
Blockchain’s key design features related to mining are 
decentralization, transparency, and unregulation. In order to 
ensure its trustworthiness, the mining protocol is decentralized 
and transparent with all miners having access to the block’s 
problem and the incentive to publicly share their proof-of-work 
[2][6][41]. The check by consensus facilitates trust in proof-of-
work’s correctness, ensuring that no single entity can behave 
dishonestly.  
 
Unregulation, defined as the lack of legal framework 
underpinning bitcoin mining practices, has been suggested in 
Nakamoto’s vision [41] where blockchain’s control is held by 
miners and users rather than the central governmental or 
financial institutions. With a few exceptions such as Australia 
and Germany where the profit from bitcoin mining is taxed, such 
regulatory frameworks are yet to be developed. While rewards 
provide a fee-based incentive for miners’ competitive search for 
blocks’ solutions [6][37][41], the mining practices also require 
investment in terms of computational power [12][41] and 
electricity resources [39].  
2.3 Security Research on Mining-related 
Threats 
Most work on mining’s trust challenges has taken place in 
security research area and focused on the risk of an entity 
owning a large share of the network’s computational power. The 
threat of 51% attack occurs when a group owns over 50% of the 
computational power of the whole Blockchain network, 
therefore able to behave dishonestly by performing changes to 
the protocol or the public ledger’s records [15][19]. The other 
threat is 25% or selfish miners’ attack which occurs when miners 
need at least 25% [25][47], or even 50% of network’s 
computational power [16][41][55].  
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To conclude, blockchain technology and its mining protocol 
have been purposefully designed as decentralized, transparent, 
and unregulated. While these contribute to its trust, they also 
raise risks and challenges when a mining pool acquires the 
majority of computational power to control the blockchain. 
There is however limited empirical work exploring blockchain’s 




For this study, we recruited 20 miners, with the age range 22-42 
(Mean = 30.6). They are all male, with different levels of mining 
expertise: 8 have over 4 years of mining experience, 8 have 
between 1 and 4 years, and the remaining 4 have less than one 
year. Participants have a wide range of professions, including 8 
in IT, 1 in the legal services, 2 engineers, 1 in the medical field, 2 
teachers, 2 in the financial sector, and 1 in administration. In 
terms of education, 14 have Bachelor degrees, 4 have Master 
degrees, and the remaining of 4 are school leavers. The 
participants are all Malaysian and the recruitment took place via 
Facebook and Bitcoin Malaysia Telegram group.  
 
Prior work has also focused on Malaysian context for exploring 
bitcoin-related practices. For example, Sas and Khairuddin [49] 
argued that it offers a unique opportunity as a developing 
country with a steady economic growth, increased interest in 
cryptocurrency [27][36][54], and Fintech regulation [42]. 
Malaysia has the first blockchain ledger for the public 
consortium in Asia [14] and aiming by 2025 to fully utilize the 
technology in the whole country [36].  
 
The recruitment process started by approaching the founder and 
administrator of the Bitcoin Malaysia group on Facebook, 
followed by his invitation to the first author to join the Bitcoin 
Malaysia Telegram group. From within this group, we publicly 
posted invitations for participating in the study. We also sent 
private invitations to the most active members of the Telegram 
group, based on their interest in mining topic as reflected in 
their contribution to the group’s discussion forum.  
 
We conducted semi-structured interviews either face to face or 
on Skype in both English and Bahasa language from November 
2015 to February 2016. The aim of the study was to explore the 
mining process from the miners’ perspective, their motivations 
and approaches to mining, as well as the main challenges in this 
process. We also explored participants’ risks mitigation 
strategies. The interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, 
were audio recorded and fully transcribed. Data analysis 
followed a hybrid approach with existing concepts being used 
for the deductive coding while new ones grounded on the 
empirical data, is used for inductive coding [26]. The deductive 
coding included concepts from literature on mining protocol 
such as the mining work process [7][6][41] mining trends 
[12][21], mining threats [15][16][25][44][47] and concepts from 
the HCI literature on trust such as technological, social and 
institutional dimensions of trust [33], temporal, social and 
institutional embeddedness [23]. The codes were iteratively 
refined as new codes emerged under the theme of mining 




We begin by describing miners’ motivations, the main 
characteristics of blockchain technology and their impact on 
miners’ trust. In particular, we highlight the social organization 
and competitiveness of mining practices and how it is reflected 
on different approaches to mining and types of miners. We 
further outline the risks of collaborative mining due to 
centralization and dishonest administrators, and mitigating 
strategies addressing them. 
4.1 Motivations of Bitcoin Miners 
In this section, we discussed the three sources of motivation for 
engaging in mining practice as highlighted by miners.   
 4.1.1 Earning Potential through Fee-based Rewards. Almost 
half of participants appreciated the earning potential of mining 
practice [41] together with the increasing price of bitcoins [11]: 
“until today I am still continuously generating profit from this 
activity; this is my motivation” [P14]. This steady revenue fosters 
miners’ willingness to continue to invest in such lucrative 
practice by upgrading the mining equipment. Such capital costs 
are needed to ensure competitiveness in the context of 
increasing mining difficulty.  
 4.1.2 Experimenting with Bitcoin Blockchain Technology. The 
complexity of the bitcoin mining process is also attractive in 
itself, as mentioned by 3 participants. For example, from initial 
curiosity, people developed an interest in both mining and using 
bitcoins: “I have the thought like “is this a real thing”? That was 
the initial direction. Then after mining bitcoins, I transferred mine 
to the wallet and tried to sell, thinking that if I can get USD for 
them then this is real” [P16].  In such cases, participants 
appreciate the hands-on experience and the knowledge that they 
gain: “even though it is considered a high capital investment 
[practice], mining is good in terms of learning” [P11].   
 4.1.3 Lack of Regulation Regarding Taxation of Miners’ Fees. 
Despite its potential to generate income, the taxation regulation 
of this activity is not yet regulated. As it stands, the discretion to 
pay tax remains with the individual miners: “[who may be] 
willing to pay the tax whenever they get the bitcoins from mining” 
[P1]. There is also a concern that in the future the mining 
practice may become subject to taxation: “if [governments] decide 
to monitor mining activities [like] gold or silver then [they] will 
ask all bitcoin miners to register with the government” [P2]. This 






4.2 Blockchain’s Characteristics Impacting on 
Miners’ Trust 
Blockchain’s key design features related to mining are 
decentralization, transparency, unregulation, ease of use, and 
social organization, which has shaped the mining approach and 
the emergence of different types of miners. 
4.2.1 Decentralized and Transparent Mining Protocol. More 
than a quarter of participants valued the mining protocol both in 
terms of its complex validation process: “it uses the cryptographic 
hashing algorithm to secure the network so you cannot [fake] 
bitcoins” [P7], and security: “I think it is rather difficult at the 
current computing power for people to hack it” [P10]. Key to 
bitcoin’s mining protocol is the proof-of-work [41] reflecting 
miners’ systematic and transparent competition for finding the 
quickest and longest solution to a block: “this technology is based 
on the proof of work, where everything is calculated 
mathematically and is transparent” [P18]. Participants also 
expressed appreciation for this cooperative work within the 
trustless blockchain technology: “the platform is standard; 
everyone uses the same blockchain, so I don't think there is a trust 
issue” [P2]. These quotes are illustrative of miners’ trust in 
mining technology: competitive, transparent, and decentralized 
protocol under no control of central entities, which strengthens 
the credibility dimension of online trust outlined in Corritore 
and colleagues’ model [23].   
4.2.2 Non-Legally Binding Practice. No institutional authority 
such as banks or governments controls blockchain and its 
mining protocol, which in turn limits the risks of their abuse of 
power [46]. Although there have been attempts to regulate 
mining as an arguably lucrative and thus taxable practice [5], in 
many countries including Malaysia, it is not considered illegal. 
Four participants expressed satisfaction with the unregulation of 
mining practice: “I don’t see any issues here: mining is just like 
you are running a software on a computer” [P17]. As a result, 
miners operate anonymously: “all nodes in the network only know 
each other pseudo-anonymously and they have the same privilege 
but yet they can come to the consensus to agree on which record 
can be written in the database” [P11]. This unregulation limits 
miners’ perceived risks as a dimension in the model of online 
trust [23], increasing their trust in mining practice. As shown 
earlier, there is, however, the awareness that income generated 
through mining may become subject of taxation 
4.2.3 Ease of Use. Participants appreciated the ease of use of 
the mining protocol and the limited technical skills required. For 
example, four participants noted their casual experience of 
bitcoin mining: “I just let it run and once in a while, I just check to 
see […] if it doesn't calculate or the block has been full, or if there is 
something to do with my wallet which does not allow to receive the 
bitcoins” [P2]. Such quotes indicate an important dimension of 
the online trust [23], ease of use of the mining protocol, which 
further supports miners’ trust in it. 
4.3 Social Organization of Mining Practice: 
Competitiveness 
This section explores the complexity characterizing the 
competitiveness of bitcoin mining practices. It focuses on 
different forms of mining and types of miners. The identified 
forms of mining vary across computational power, its 
ownership, and maintenance which showed increased 
complexity over time. We grouped these forms in individual and 
collective mining, taking place on miner’s home machines or 
those leased from data centers (Table 1).  





[P2, P5, P12, P18] 
Home-pool mining 
[P1, P3, P4, P7, P9, P10, P11, 





Data center-pool mining 
Owned: P6; Leased: P8, P13, P14  
Table 1: Mining approaches 
4.3.1 Home-Solo Mining. The first form of mining that has 
historically emerged consisted of individual miners working on 
their own home machines. A quarter of participants expressed 
appreciation for this cooperative and competitive work requiring 
limited computational power [41]. Our findings indicate that 16 
participants who mined during 2010-12 have engaged in this 
form of mining: “I started as a home miner in 2011, mining on my 
computer; and at that time bitcoin was not as popular as now” 
[P5]. This quote is similar to others confirming the limited 
mining’s difficulty in those early days [6]. With this advantage, 
home miners worked solely enjoying the full rewards of their 
labor: “in early days people use to do solo mining and all profits 
will straight away go into your wallet” [P18]. With no 
intermediaries between the miners and the bitcoin network, the 
trust consisted solely of trust in the mining protocol, as 
expressed by three of participants: “they didn't have any problem 
to trust each other […] they mined by themselves and they were 
referring to the same ledger” [P3]. This quote reflects the 
characteristics of trustless blockchain mining protocol which 
provide a transparent and fair competition among miners for 
processing transactions [41]. 
However, at the end of 2010, the mining’s difficulty has 
considerably increased [21]. This, in turn, affected solo miners, 
due to the small computational power of their individual 
machines. Two participants shared this view: “due to high 
difficulty, solo mining is now no longer relevant” [P12], and it 
paved the way for collaborative mining, and in particular for 
what we call home-pool mining. 
4.3.2 Home-Pool Mining. From solo mining, home miners 
started to shift towards collaborative mining. Mining pools 
consist of geographically distributed home miners and their 
network of machines pooling together computational resources 
and share of the profits [9][6] [10][22] by acting as a sole entity 
in the competitive solving of blocks’ problems. A quarter of 
participants expressed this view: “mining pool is actually the 
entity that controls the hash power in the network [and] the income 
An Exploration of Bitcoin Mining Practices  
 
 
that it generates is divided among miners, according to the hash 
power that they have contributed to that pool” [P4]. This indicates 
that in addition to end miners, a new type of miner has emerged: 
the pool administrator who creates his own pool to gather the 
computational power of end miners and automatically divides 
the mining profits to each miner according to their individual 
contributed power. As a home pool tend to be small in size [39] 
usually consisting of 10-15 miners, the equity of profit 
distribution is not usually an issue. The home-pool mining offers 
the increased likelihood of success, as reported by two 
participants: “I shared with my friend back in the university to buy 
a second-hand computer and a powerful graphic card. Each of us 
spent around RM 1500 and we started to mine” [P19]. Apart from 
creating such pools, people also started to join existing pools, as 
mentioned by four participants: “I mined in a pool because with 
solo mining it is difficult to get profit” [P10].  
In the late of 2012, after the first halving period [6] the 
difficulties of mining have further increased [21], negatively 
affecting home miners, as noted by almost half of participants: 
“from normal CPU I upgraded to GPU. The difficulty level was 
increasing and my system did not generate enough coins. So I stop 
mining around 2012” [P5]. This indicates that even though the 
miners had taken the efforts to improve their machines’ 
computational power, this did not suffice as they faced 
additional challenges due to higher maintenance costs. For 
example, four participants noted that in order to continue to 
mine competitively, the computational power needs upgrading: 
“for home mining, let’s say you bought the latest S7 mining 
machine and joined a pool, you can get a few bitcoins for the first 
few months. [Then] you need to add more hashing power to your 
machine [because] the difficulty of mining keeps increasing. That’s 
why many home miners retire from doing this job” [P17]. In 
addition, maintenance also relates to high electricity cost: 
“machine is very expensive and the electricity bill can be around 
RM100k per month. So you won't get your money back unless you 
go big scale” [P3]. Furthermore, three participants pointed to the 
challenge of locating the machines in their homes due to the 
generated heat: “because my house will be very hot” [P3]. 
Together, these challenges have led twelve of participants [P1, 
P3, P4, P5, P7, P9, P10, P11, P15, P16, P17, and P19], to retire from 
home mining, three [P2, P12, and P18] to continually upgrade 
their home mining system by creating so-called mining farms, 
with a cluster of machines owned by one person, and located 
outside one’s home, usually in a rented place. One participant 
considerably scaled up his mining systems so that “today I own a 
data center company for mining” [P6]. The remaining four 
participants [P8, P13, P14, and P20] joined directly the cloud 
mining through data centers. 
4.3.3 Data Center-Pool Mining. The increasing challenges of 
bitcoin home mining have radically transformed it into large-
scale mining, beyond the confine of miners’ own homes. As 
noted by three participants: “as the difficulty of mining is 
increasing every day, for now, you can only mine at bigger scale” 
[P10]. Data centers allow “cloud mining, where people buy 
computational power in return for the share of the profit” [P1]. As 
pointed out by one participant, data centers also need to mine in 
pools in order to sustain their profits: “if you want to mine as an 
owner of a data center then you need to have large capital […] at 
the same time, you have to join a mining pool to make profit” [P1]. 
To address these challenges bitcoin data centers have started to 
emerge [37]: “the best option is joining the cloud mining, where 
you can buy a share from the owners of the data center to do the 
mining for you” [P9]. Compared to the home mining, data 
centers require much larger capital and maintenance costs. 
These include not only the cost of electricity but also of the 
monitoring equipment and manpower to maintain the center as 
illustrated in this quote of a data center administrator: “I used 
special software monitor [...] I can login from my mobile and I am 
able to gather data on the current temperature. I also hire a worker 
to ensure the cabling and network are well maintained” [P6].  
More than a quarter of participants valued the opportunity 
of data center-pool mining because of the inability to setup their 
own mining pool: “the difficulty today is very high and the 
electricity cost is expensive too. So it is not worth mining at small 
scale. I think for today, cloud mining is the best way” [P13]. In 
addition, leasing the mining service does not require technical 
expertise: “data centers offer a 3-year contract, when I get my 
daily profit from the hired miner  […] When I joined the program, I 
got the id and password to access to the company website, they also 
give me a wallet so all profit will be straight away sent to my 
wallet” [P20]. Cloud mining is further appreciated because the 
challenge of machines’ maintenance is met by the data center, as 
highlighted by a quarter of participants: “for the cloud miners, 
you don’t have the miner at home. It is all maintained in the data 
center [so] you don’t have to pay any utilities. But you have to pay 
the owner of the data center usually around 20% of the total profit” 
[P5]. This and a similar quote: “I need to pay around 30% of my 
daily profit for the maintenance fee to the company” [P9] indicate 
that the skills of data centers’ administrators for setting and 
maintaining the mining machines comes at a non-trivial cost for 
the end miners. 
4.4 Types of Miners 
Findings indicate four main types of miners: end miners, pool 
administrators, data center administrators, and Bitcoin core 
developers. These types differ in their expertise, power over the 
practice, approach to mining and numbers, with the largest 
number represented by the end miners (Figure 1). 
4.4.1 Bitcoin Core Developer. Bitcoin mining protocol is 
controlled by the five blockchain experts, as mentioned by a 
quarter of participants: “bitcoin technology has been created by 
Satoshi who has passed the responsibility to the Bitcoin core 
developers. These five persons have the authority to edit the bitcoin 
code, although any amendments need to meet consensus” [P5]. 
Interestingly, almost a quarter of participants expressed 





the claim of decentralization of the mining practice: “Bitcoin 
technology is depending on these five persons which actually 






Figure 1: Pyramid of types of miners 
4.4.2 Mining Pool Administrator. Pool administrators have 
emerged within collaborative mining in order to facilitate 
miners’ access to mining pools. Administrators’ technical skills 
are more advanced than end miners’ as they are required to set 
up, run and maintain the machines within the pools: “currently 
there are many pools and all miners […] need to go through those 
pools which are created by the bitcoin administrators” [P5], and 
“such pools are hard to set up and maintain” [P12]. Such 
specialized technical skills are not easy to master and have given 
administrators the advantage of controlling the mining activity 
and the distribution of reward. In addition, almost half of 
participants also acknowledge the high level of skills required by 
administrators who act as pool manufacturers to develop more 
competitive mining chips. Mining pools could be joined in by 
miners with different computational power from end miners 
owning own machines at home (increasingly unprofitable), to 
those owning mining farms, or data centers. 
4.4.3 Data Center Administrators. The increased mining 
competition demanded higher computational power. This has 
made room for data center administrators to enter the scene. 
They provided end miners the opportunity of leasing machines 
hosted and maintained within the data centers: “my friend owns 
a data center offering cloud mining service” [P5].  The data centers 
also join mining pools in order to increase their likelihood of 
successful mining, but the decision of which pool to join is made 
solely by the administrator: “the mining process is controlled by 
the mining pool” [P6]. The privilege of pool administrator to 
distribute rewards to each entity in the pool according to the 
computational power brought in, cascades down to the data 
center administrator who further distributes such reward to the 
end miners within the center. 
4.4.4 End Miners. While miners engaged in solo home 
mining had to develop technical skills for setting and 
maintaining their own machines, the emergence of collective 
mining and of administrators supporting it, has led to end 
miners’ deskilling. More than half of participants noted end 
miners’ limited technical expertise: “it is very easy: I download 
the software from the pool, I do the setup […] let my leased 
machine run for 24/7 [and] I monitor it to make sure that it doesn't 
crash and is connected to the internet” [P10].  
End miners have limited power, as they are at the discretion 
of pool administrators for distributing equitable profits. In order 
to remain competitive, they also have to follow the trend set by 
their pool administrator for upgrading their leased machines: “as 
a miner, we must regularly update our mining machine according 
to the latest chips produced by the manufacturer, to ensure we are 
able to maintain the reward” [P6].  
4.5  Trust Challenges of Collaborative Mining 
The benefits of collaborative mining are offset by some 
important trust-related challenges. These pertain to the risks of 
mining protocol and centralization of mining practices, as well 
as the challenge of social trust between end miners and data 
centers/pool administrators.  
4.5.1 Risks of Mining Protocol. An important finding is the 
three challenges of the mining protocol pointed out by most of 
the participants. These relate to the increased time for acquiring 
block confirmation, limited block size, and a limited number of 
full nodes. Interestingly, each of these technology-related risks 
steams from the purposefully designed blockchain protocol. For 
instance, multiple confirmations required for recording a block 
was intended to limit the risk of double spending attack [6][21], 
but their numbers increased from 3 to 6 leading to delays: “the 6 
confirmations waiting time is bothering me a lot” [P12], or 
unconfirmed blocks: “there were also cases when there was no 
confirmation for quite sometimes, and the bitcoins were eventually 
returned back to you” [P19].  
The current blockchain protocol also limits the size of each 
block to 1MB and about half of the participants expressed 
concerns: “this block size limits the transactions acting as a 
bottleneck” [P18]. This challenge has received considerable 
attention in security field [31], and led to increased mining’s 
competitiveness and incentive-based fees: “people have to 
increase the mining fee to give a chance to their transactions to be 
included in the block; however, this removes the benefit of cheap 
transactions” [P12]. Not at least, there is a shortage of full nodes 
designed to host a full copy of the blockchain: “we have about 
6000 full nodes and the number is not sufficient to support the 
current demand” [P1].  
Although critical for the decentralization of blockchain, the 
full nodes are resource-demanding [7], and many end miners 
lack the incentive to host them. Perceived risk in technology is 
one of the three factors in Corritore and colleagues’ model of 
online trust [[23]. Our findings point to these blockchain design 
features as risks minimizing end miners’ trust in the protocol, 
especially since they lack both control and high-level expertise 
needed to address them. 
4.5.2 Dishonest End Miners: Selfish Attacks Unconfirmed. A 
striking finding is our limited empirical evidence of selfish 
miners’ attacks commonly discussed in security research 
[16][25][47][55]. First, the majority of participants are not aware 
of such attacks. Second, for the few ones that were aware of 
selfish miners’ attacks, two out of three participants  expressed 
optimism: “for me, that is just a theoretical concern [because] such 
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computational power [which] I would say it is not possible” [P1]. In 
addition, another participant extends this argument claiming 
that even if selfish miners’ attacks occur, they can be detected by 
the protocol: “yes, this can happen […] but after a while, the 
system will know […] then the system will put the mining server to 
one side, so then other miners will know that they can't trust that 
particular mining server at this IP address” [P7].  
Therefore, our findings support the theoretical perspective 
of Bitcoin core developers [16][55] on the reduced likelihood of 
such attacks. Indeed, in his original white paper [41], Satoshi 
mentioned that the bitcoin network is secure, providing the 
attacking power must not exceed the total collaborative power of 
the trust nodes. This may be different in the dystopian future 
suggested by two participants, where the advent of quantum 
computing may provide sufficient computational power to one 
pool for a 51% attack: “current computing power is too high to 
hack […] but with the future quantum computer […] there is a 
possibility that the bitcoin network will be affected” [P18].  
Although mining is an anonymous practice, the machine IP 
is visible online, acting as a proxy for its miner. While selfish 
miners can change their machines, this is unlikely to happen 
often, which means that the IP offers a history of mining 
behavior’s trustworthiness. This provides support for the 
temporal and social embeddedness as contextual properties of 
the framework on mechanics of trust [45]. 
4.5.3 Centralization of Mining Practices. Findings indicate 
that mining is a highly competitive practice which requires 
increased investment in computational power so that miners 
could continue to generate profit. This trend is consistent with 
the planned scarcity of bitcoins [21]. Figure 1 shows that the 
distribution of power among miners is not equal, but 
concentrated towards the top and middle level of the pyramid.  
Centralization is critical with respect to miners’ social trust as it 
entails power imbalance between end miners on the one hand, 
and mining administrators and core developers on the other 
hand. It is also aligned with higher technical skills, so that end 
miners joining pools face the risk of deskilling and of lower 
profit distributed by the pool administrators.  
Centralization of mining occurs both at pool level and 
between pools, with larger ones contributing with a higher 
percentage of computational power: “there is a lot of 
centralization in a mining pool. Each of the larger pools controls 
like 20-30% of the contributed hash rate. So miners were actually 
controlled by the pool that they joined” [P12].  
Findings also indicate centralization by geography, with 
several participants acknowledging China’s massive growth in 
miners’ number [P6] and its dominance of bitcoin mining 
practices: “it may have the authority to control the bitcoins price 
because of its largest bitcoin market share” [P5]. This dominance 
is supported by China’s low-cost energy supply [56] and 
effective mining techniques: “they mine in a very professional 
way [through] lower and upper cooling systems and proper server 
racks [using] professional hydroelectric generator and water 
cooling system to reduce the cost” [P16]. China also considers 
legalizing mining practice [52] and is an innovation leader in 
mining manufacturing: “capable of designing chips […] to shrink 
the size and improve the mining process” [P3]. 
These findings challenge the credibility of mining behavior, 
as a dimension of online trust in Corritore and colleagues’ model 
[23], suggesting that end miners’ trust in higher level miners is 
negatively affected. It also indicates the perceived risk of 
centralization, with risk being a limiting dimension of trust in 
the above model [23]. 
4.5.4 Dishonest Mining Pool and Data Center Administrators. 
This section further unpacks the challenge of social trust 
between end miners and data centers/pool administrators. For 
this, we describe its main sources, steaming from the limited 
regulatory framework for sanctioning dishonest behavior: lack 
of audit for the distribution of rewards, the invisibility of data 
center offering cloud mining, and administrators’ lack of 
accountability. 
4.5.5 Lack of Audit for the Distribution of Rewards. The most 
common trust challenge of dishonest mining pool or data center 
administrators relates to their privileged position of collecting 
the computational power of their end miners in order to 
proportionally distribute the rewards. Unfortunately, some 
administrators abuse this power, a trust issue mentioned by 
almost half of participants: “a trust issue between miners and pool 
administrators may arise because the administrators are 
responsible for collecting all the hashing power and distributing the 
accurate rewards to all miners” [P3].  
This challenge is due to the limited shared knowledge or 
audit trail of the pool’s or data center’s overall hash power, 
which in turn, allows the administrators to report inaccurately 
smaller profits for their end miners. Indeed, dishonest 
administrators may claim higher hashes power to attract miners 
to join in, but report underperformance with respect to the 
targeted amount of blocks, which in turn allow them to deliver 
unfairly smaller rewards: “each [large] pool controls like 20-30% of 
the hash rate and this amount is not known by the miner” [P12]. 
Prior work has confirmed this lack of transparency with 
respect to the pool’s hash power [58]. This outcome extends the 
value of online information for supporting website credibility 
[4][40] to mining pools and data centers, particularly the need 
for information regarding the overall computational power and 
transparent mechanisms for reward distribution. 
4.5.6 Invisibility of Data Centers. An interesting finding 
relates to the lack of visibility of the cloud computing 
infrastructure underpinning data centers. Several participants 
pointed this out: “I don’t have 100% trust in all mining programs 
that I joined because it is something that I cannot see. I don’t even 
know if the data center really exists” [P8]. Even if the location of 
the data center is known, the lack of visibility of the hired 
machine leads to additional trust challenges: “I have invested my 
money, but actually, I don’t even see the machine that I bought. It 





Iceland” [P20]. This lack of visibility of cloud computing is an 
important technology-based trust challenge which started to be 
explored [8][43][44]. Our findings further highlight the 
importance of online information [4][40] to support trust in data 
centers, particularly in terms of their physical presence, 
contactable local representatives, testimonial-based reputation, 
and authorization from the local administration. Data centers are 
service providers which arguably should operate within a 
regulatory framework, and it is surprising that our findings 
suggest otherwise.  
4.5.7 Mining Program Scams: Lack of Accountability. A 
critical trust challenge relates to deceitful mining programs 
mentioned by two participants, one of whom has been a scam 
victim: “I have joined a mining program […] at first everything 
looked fine: I received bitcoins every day for 2 weeks, but then it 
stopped. I tried to contact the person who introduced me to that 
mining program but he couldn’t be reached and I realized that it 
was actually a scam” [P8]. This quite illustrates the concern for 
leveraging data center’s unfunded reputation for attracting end 
miners, since there are no legal implications of such dishonest 
behavior. From the perspective of mechanics of trust’s 
framework, these findings shed light into end miners’ limited 
trust on higher level miners because of the lack of institutional 
embeddedness [45] for legally sanctioning more powerful miners 
acting dishonestly. 
4.6  Mitigating Trust Risks of Collaborative     
Mining 
Findings indicate that end miners employ two strategies for 
mitigating the risks of social trust in pool or data center 
administrators. These include selecting reputable major pools, 
and decentralizing collaborative mining.  
4.6.1 Selecting Reputable Major Pools. To address the risk of 
mining program scams and of unfair distribution of rewards, 
most miners engage in careful scrutiny of the pool to be joined: 
“you must make sure to choose a reputable pool” [P3]. This is not 
trivial, as findings indicate that the information provided by the 
data centers to support such scrutiny is limited which in turn 
adds to their invisibility challenge.  
Unsurprisingly, reputable pools are large and most miners 
select major pools: “the main thing is to make sure that the pool is 
good enough, by looking at the pool contributions and if it is about 
30% of the overall, then I think it is good enough” [P18]. Through 
their proven history of acting in good faith, reputable major 
pools offer proxy ways towards reputation, through the 
motivation to preserve future behavior. This strategy confirms 
the framework on mechanics of trust [45] on warranting end 
miners’ trust in pool administrators because of their reputation 
(social embeddedness and credibility), albeit not institutional 
embeddedness. Prior work has emphasized the importance of 
accountability in cloud computing to be supported both 
technically and legally [45]. While reputable pools are perceived 
as fair, they are not necessarily regulated in terms of being 
accountable for failing to deliver their contracts with end miners. 
Indeed, pools do not divulge the identity of their administrators 
other than by their IP addresses.  
4.6.2 Decentralizing Collaborative Mining. A consequence of 
end miners’ preference for reputable large pools is their growth 
in size, to an extent that such pools could challenge the 
decentralization principle of mining protocol [6]. A major 
concern here is that when largest pools are getting close to 
representing 50% of the network’s hash power, they can enable 
serious negative behaviors such reversing transactions and 
double spending [16][41][55]. In an attempt to address miners’ 
centralization and circumvent pool administrators, miners have 
engaged in “initiatives to build decentralized pool such as the 
P2Pool” [P12]. Such pools benefit from the advantage of 
collaborative mining but without the need of a central 
administrator [29]. This strategy strengthens the pool’s 
credibility and reputation, reducing the risk of administrators’ 
abuse of power. A limitation of these decentralized pools is that 
they are challenging to build, currently small with the limited 
share of the network’s computational power and need time to 
grow [29]. An alternative strategy to address the challenge of 
centralization of collaborative mining is its self-organization, 
with miners voluntarily leaving those pools at risk of gaining too 
much hash power [30]. This strategy strengthens the credibility 
dimension of online trust depicted in Corritore and colleagues’ 
model [23], as well as the intrinsic properties warranting trust 
from the framework on mechanics of trust [45] such as 
benevolence and trustworthiness of end miners and pool 
administrators. 
 
5 Theoretical Implications 
We now discuss the value of our findings for HCI research on 
trust. Recent work has argued that the exploration of bitcoin-
related practices offers unique opportunities to understand trust, 
as they challenge common assumptions of financial transactions’ 
centralization and regulation [48]. Given the study’s focus on a 
developing country, our implications are mostly relevant for 
mining in such contexts. They may also hold value for 
understanding and supporting trust in bitcoin mining practices 
worldwide, as future work in this emerging research area may 
focus on exploring.  
 
5.1   Towards a Model of Trust among Bitcoin 
Miners  
Our findings contribute towards a model of trust among bitcoin 
miners (Figure: 2). They extend previous outcomes on the 
feasibility of HCI trust theories [23][45][49] and their application 
not only to bitcoin users [49] but also to miners. We identified 
blockchain’s characteristics impacting on trust. Those 
supporting trusts include the decentralization, unregulation, and 
ease of use of the mining protocol, while those impeding trusts 
consist of specific protocol-related risks, the emerging 
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centralization of the mining practice, and dishonest pool and 
data center administrators. 
 
According to Sas and Khairuddin’s [49] bitcoin trust framework, 
our findings indicate that the purposefully designed 
decentralization and unregulation strengthen miners’ 
technological trust. With respect to social trust, outcomes 
suggest that the main challenge is not among end miners, but 
between end miners and dishonest pool and data center 
administrators. In terms of the institutional trust, similar to 
bitcoin users, miners distrust financial and government 
institutions, but the unregulation of mining practices mitigates 
their perceived risk of abuse of power [53]. Interestingly, 
because of the unregulation, governments’ trust in mining 
practice is lacking behind. 
 
The application of the model of online trust [23] indicates 
miners’ ambivalence towards the technological trust in mining 
protocol. Findings highlight specific protocol-related 
characteristics impacting on the three dimensions of trust: 
credibility, ease of use, and risks. In addition to decentralization, 
the credibility of the trustless mining protocol is ensured by its 
transparency, social organization, competitiveness, 
predictability, reputation, and embedded high-level expertise of 
the core developers. Miners’ trust in the protocol is also 
supported by its ease of use, but challenged by the risks of 
increased time for acquiring block confirmation, limited block 
size, and the number of full nodes. 
 
The framework on mechanics of trust [45] allowed us to explore 
the social trust among different types of miners and in particular 
the end miners’ risk mitigation strategies for dealing with 
dishonest pool and data center administrators. Interestingly, 
although the trust among end miners has not been flagged as 
salient, the continual use of a mining machine offers through its 
IP a proxy indicator for miner’s reputation (temporal and social 
embeddedness) [43]. However, given the invisibility of cloud 
mining, administrators’ reputation is more critical and therefore 
mechanisms for signaling it are much needed. 
 
Additional reasons include the risk of scam due to 
administrators’ lack of accountability and lack of audit for the 
distribution of mining rewards. To address these risks, end 
miners’ select large pools which have been around for a while 
and have gathered a large number of end miners. Pools’ history 
offers a proxy for their reputation (social embeddedness and 
credibility), but their administrators continue to lack the ability 
to be legally sanctioned for dishonest behavior [45]. 
 
5.2 The Paradox of Decentralization 
Decentralization is a key principle both of the blockchain and 
the mining protocol [22][41]. It ensures the distributed network 
of independent miners engage in competitive-collaborative work  
 
for recording the proof-of-work on the block, in the absence of 
any central authority [22][28]. In contrast to this theoretical 
principle, findings indicate that in practice there is a strong 
tendency towards the centralization of mining practices. This is 
due to its difficulty and growing demand for computational 
power that miners need to ensure in order to remain 
competitive.  
 
Currently, the only way to remain competitive is to join one’s 
computational power with that of other miners’ in a pool. As an 
increasing number of miners have joined the most reputable 
largest pools in the network, we witness the centralization of 
mining practices within such pools. Our findings indicate that 
centralization also occurs at a geographic level, particularly 
because of China’s dominance in bitcoin mining and 
manufacturing. There is also a trend of centralizing miners’ 
power across the different types of miners outlined in Figure 1, 
with the end miners at the bottom of the pyramid benefitting 
from the lowest level of technical skills and power to alter the 
protocol or to distribute the mining rewards. The key strategy to 
minimize the monopoly of power is by developing fully 
decentralized pools with no central administrator [29].  
 
5.3  The Challenge of Unregulation 
Apart from decentralization, the unregulation of blockchain 
technology is another key design principle highlighted in 
Nakamoto’s vision [41]. Intended to ensure the privacy of the 
owners of bitcoin addresses, unregulation also ensures the 
anonymity of bitcoin miners so that they could continue to 
support the blockchain irrespectively of its legal status. This, 
however, raises an interesting challenge when it comes to 
dishonest miners. Our findings indicate end miners’ effort to 
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leverage the limitedly available reputation of pool and data 
center administrators, i.e., temporal and social embeddedness 
warranting social trust [45]. They also suggest end miners’ 
inability to legally sanction dishonest administrators, i.e., lack of 
institutional embeddedness [45].  
 
This is an important finding confirming that in addition to 
governments [48], the need for regulation has been also 
expressed by other actors in blockchain ecosystem such as 
bitcoin users [49], albeit for different rationale, i.e., to sanction 
dishonest traders. Interestingly, however, data centers are 
service providers which as business entities are typically deemed 
to operate within the national regulatory frameworks, 
particularly if they provide additional cloud-based services 
subject to taxation. We argue for the value of sharing online 
information on data centers’ authorization. This will strengthen 
their credibility and reputation which in turn will attract more 
end miners, while at them time readdresses the current power 
imbalance between administrators and end miners by 
empowering the latter with institutional embeddedness [45]. 
 
6 Design Implications 
We now discuss the design implications [50] that our findings 
entailed. They highlight the value of new tools for monitoring 
hash power and reward distribution in data centers and mining 
pools, decentralized tools for tracking data centers’ authorization 
and reputation, and authoring tools for supporting end miners’ 
development of decentralized pools. These design implications 
have been developed to address the identified social trust 
challenge of dishonest administrators, and the risk of 
centralization of mining practices. 
 
6.1 Tools for Monitoring Hash Power & Reward 
Distribution  
Findings indicate that the most challenging social trust issue of 
collaborative mining is the unfair distribution of rewards that 
pool and data center administrators are privileged to perform. 
This is rooted in a lack of audit of pool’s and data centers’ 
computational power. One way to address this challenge is to 
design monitoring tools to support such an audit and provide 
transparent mechanisms for the distribution of rewards. Such 
tools will automatically capture and report key metrics involved 
in the calculation of profits: overall percentage of pools’ or data 
center’s computing power contributed to the network, the 
number of solved blocks within time unit, the total computing 
power used to solve each block [17][57] as well as daily total 
reward, together with the percentage of profit due to each end 
miner based on their individual power contribution. Mechanisms 
to implement these have started to emerge for instance in Slush 
Pool’s transparent calculation of hash-proof-rate [51]. This could 
be extended with open source monitoring dashboards accessible 
to end miners.  
 
6.2 Decentralized Tools Tracking Data Centers’ 
Authorization and Reputation 
Study outcomes also highlight social trust challenges related to 
the invisibility of cloud mining and lack of accountability of data 
center administrators. In addition to administrators’ willingness 
to share online information regarding their data center’s 
authorization, their social and institutional embeddedness [45] 
can be further strengthened. For example, there are already 
attempts to centralize information on authorized data center 
offering cloud mining services [1]. We suggest the value of 
designing decentralized tools for not only capturing data centers’ 
authorization details but also verifying and recording them 
within the blockchain. Such tools could also include database 
interface supporting end miners to provide reputation feedback. 
This, in turn, can help the miners to make informed choices for 
joining specific data centers. 
 
6.3 Tools for Developing Decentralized Pools 
Findings indicate the risk of mining’s centralization in larger 
pools which conflicts with the decentralization principle of 
blockchain and mining protocol [22][41]. A strategy for 
addressing this challenge is the development of fully 
decentralized pools with no central administrator. Although this 
has been previously suggested, the development of such pools 
requires technical competency not easily available among end 
miners [29]. One solution would be new authoring tools 
supporting and incentivizing end miners to develop 
decentralized pools. Their design can benefit by drawing from 
research on the end-user development of open source software 
and their design tools. This design implication also aligns with 
prior views, such as Buterin’s [17] suggestion for open source 
cross-platform applications allowing end miners to create 
mining pools through simple user interfaces. 
 
6 Conclusions 
The interview study described in this paper explored 
blockchain’s characteristics fostering and hindering miners’ 
trust, and in particular the risks of collaborative mining and 
miners’ strategies for mitigating them. We further advanced the 
theory towards a model of blockchain trust by discussing how 
decentralization, unregulation, ease of use, and social 
organization impact on both technological and social trust 
among different types of miners. Findings also led to three 
design implications that will support blockchain miners develop 
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